Access regulation and the transition from copper to fiber networks in telecoms by Bourreau, M. et al.
Access regulation and the transition from copper to ber
networks in telecoms
Marc Bourreauy, Carlo Cambiniz, P¬nar Do¼ganx
June 11, 2013
Abstract
In this paper we study the impact of di¤erent forms of access obligations on rmsincentives
to migrate from the legacy copper network to ultra-fast broadband infrastructures. We analyze
three di¤erent kinds of regulatory interventions: geographical regulation of access to copper
networks where access prices are di¤erentiated depending on whether or not an alternative
ber network has been deployed; access obligations on ber networks and its interplay with
wholesale copper prices; and, nally, a mandatory switch-o¤ of the legacy copper network to
foster the transition to the higher quality ber networks. Trading-o¤ the di¤erent static and
dynamic goals, the paper provides guidelines and suggestions for policy makersdecisions.
Keywords: Access pricing; Investment; Next generation networks.
JEL Codes: L96; L51.
We thank participants at the 13th ACCC Regulatory Conference 2012 in Brisbane (AUS), and at the workshop
"Public Intervention and Regulation" held in Capri (2012). Carlo Cambini acknowledges nancial support from the
Italian Ministry of Education (No. 20089PYFHY_004).
yTelecom ParisTech, Department of Economics and Social Sciences, and CREST-LEI, Paris. Email:
marc.bourreau@telecom-paristech.fr.
zPolitecnico di Torino, Deparment of Management and Economics, & EUI. Email: carlo.cambini@polito.it.
xHarvard Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. E-mail: pinar_dogan@hks.harvard.edu.
1
1 Introduction
Investments in next-generation ber networks have been focal to policy makersattention, because
the high-speed Internet services that rely on these networks are expected to have a signicant impact
on the society and the economy as a whole (Czernich et al., 2011). For example, in the European
Union (EU), the European Commission (EC) has dened specic targets for the development of
broadband services.1 However, recent data from the European Commission - DG Infosoc (2012)
shows that these targets are at a far reach from the current status of broadband services in the
EU, and therefore they can only be met if substantial infrastructure investments take place in the
coming years.2
While policy makers aim at promoting investments in ber networks, the regulatory tools that
they use to achieve other ends, such static e¢ ciency, can be detrimental for such infrastructure
investments. In particular, it is often argued that setting too attractive terms of access to the
legacy network to promote short-run competition can hinder entrant rms to invest in their own
infrastructure and also reduce the infrastructure ownersincentives to maintain and upgrade their
network.3 Infrastructure investments can be hindered not only by the current regulatory access
policies, but also by the (perceived) future regulatory "threats," to the extent that they undermine
the rmsexpected returns from investment.
Fine tuning access policies to better address the tensions between di¤erent regulatory objectives
is a challenging task, and the policy recommendations made so far by market specialists appear to be
in sharp contrast with one another. For example, in a recent report for the European Competitive
Telecommunication Association (ECTA), WIK (2011) proposes to decrease the access price to the
1More specically, the EC has set 30 Mbps as a minimum level of broadband connection that should be available
to all EU citizens by 2013. As a longer term target, the EC has dened 100 Mbps as the minimum level of broadband
connection that at least half of the EU households should have access to by 2020.
2Currently, 7.2 % of all xed lines provide speeds over 30 Mbps, and only 1.3% over 100Mbps.
3See Cambini and Jiang (2009) for a recent and comprehensive survey on the relation between access regulation
and investment.
2
legacy (copper) networks to encourage incumbents to invest in new (ber) networks, and to allow
a rapid switch-o¤ of the copper networks where ber has already been installed. In contrast to
WIK (2011)s suggestion, in its report for the European (incumbent) Telecommunications Network
Operators (ETNO), Plum (2011) states that a lower access price to the copper network would
encourage customers to remain on copper, which would in turn discourage investments in next-
generation access networks.4 In its recent report prepared for DG Information Society and Media,
Haydock et al. (2012) from Charles River Associates argue that whether lower access prices to
copper would trigger investment in ber depends crucially on whether copper and ber networks
are operated in parallel. More specically, they argue that lower access prices for copper would
likely spur investment in ber if copper is switched o¤ at the time of ber deployment, and that
the e¤ect of copper access prices on incentives to invest in ber is ambiguous otherwise.
More often than not, copper and ber networks do coexist, at least during a transitional phase
of some length (i.e., when the copper network is not switched o¤ immediately after the ber
deployment). By and large, the formal analysis on access pricing and investment by both incumbent
and entrant rms considers settings in which the adoption of the new technology eliminates the
old technology.5 Two notable recent exceptions are the studies by Inderst and Peitz (2012), and
Bourreau, Cambini and Do¼gan (2012).6 Inderst and Peitz (2012) consider a setting in which both
the legacy and the new infrastructure can coexist, and show that a higher access price to the legacy
4The potential impact of access policies in the transition from copper to ber networks is acknowledged by the
EC; see the EU Recommendation C(2010) 6223 on Regulated Access to NGANs(September 2010). In December
2012 the EC presented a new draft of recommendation stating that the access prices of the traditional copper
networks should remain stable over the coming years in order to sustain investment in next-generation network by
both incumbent and entrant rms (European Commission, 2012; paragraph 44 and 45).
5See for example, Gans and Williams (1999), Gans (2001), (2007), Foros (2004), Bourreau and Do¼gan (2005),
(2006), Hori and Mizuno (2006), (2009), Kotakorpi (2006), Avenali et al. (2010), and Vareda and Hoernig (2010).
These papers explore the impact of the access scheme on investment, when the investment decisions are zero-one
in nature.
6See also Brito et al. (2012) who focus on the nature of innovation, which can be either drastic or non-drastic.
Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012a) provide a review of the literature, with a particular focus on the process of
migration from the legacy to the next generation infrastructures, and discuss the possibility of geographical access
regulation. Bourreau, Lupi and Manenti (2013) study the migration from an old to a higher quality new technology
when rms can o¤er services from both technologies.
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network lowers the incumbents incentives to invest, while increasing that of the competing rm
(who does not own a network at the beginning). The investment incentives of the entrants can
be amplied even further if the incumbent and the entrants can sign contracts to x the terms of
usage of the new network.
While Inderst and Peitz (2012) consider network investment decisions in a single area (e.g., a
country), Bourreau et al. (2012) consider di¤erent geographical areas within a country that di¤er
with respect to the cost of rolling out the ber network. They show that a higher access price
to the legacy network fosters the entrants rm investments, but that it has an ambiguous e¤ect
on the incumbents investments due to two conicting e¤ects: the wholesale revenue e¤ect, and
the retail-level migration e¤ect. A higher access price increases the incumbents opportunity cost
of investment due to the wholesale revenue e¤ect (if the incumbent invests in a higher quality
network, the entrant may invest in reaction, and the incumbent will then lose some wholesale
prots). Furthermore, since the copper and ber networks coexist, higher access prices (which
imply high prices for the services provided with the copper network) also imply relatively high
prices for the services provided with the ber networks, increasing the returns from investing in
ber. This retail-level migration e¤ect works in the opposite direction from that of the wholesale
revenue e¤ect, and hence, the net e¤ect is ambiguous. Bourreau et al. show that the regulation
of the access price to copper, alone, cannot overcome the tension between di¤erent regulatory
objectives, namely, the promotion of static e¢ ciency, fostering investments in new infrastructures,
and avoiding unnecessary duplication of (ber) networks.
While these studies shed light on how the access price to the legacy network may a¤ect invest-
ment incentives for the transition from copper to ber, this single access price turns out to be a
rather limited tool, as the authors consider a single (uniform) price for access. Furthermore, these
studies consider regulation of access only to the copper network. Regulatory requirements of access
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to ber networks is not only a theoretical possibility, but is also hotly debated in several European
countries. For example, in France, Germany, Italy, the UK and Spain, access to ducts and (less
often) to dark ber is mandated, while in other countries (such as the Netherlands and Germany)
unbundling of ber networks has been imposed (Cullen International, 2012).
In this paper we build on Bourreau et al. (2012) and address the following questions. First, can
access price discrimination across di¤erent geographical areas resolve the tension between di¤erent
regulatory objectives? This is an important question to address, as the latest EU Recommendation
on ber access points to geographically di¤erentiated access remedies as one of the new approaches
to be considered.7 We nd that setting di¤erent access prices in di¤erent areas according to the
ber network roll-out improves regulatory outcomes, but it does not resolve the tension among
di¤erent objectives entirely.
Second, when the ber network is also subject to ex-ante access regulation, what is the (po-
tential) interplay between the access prices for the copper and ber networks?8 We nd that
regulators should not set the access prices to the two infrastructures independently, and that the
sign of the correlation between the two prices should depend on which operator the incumbent or
the entrant is expected to be the leader in ber roll-out. When the incumbent has a larger ber
coverage than the entrant, the regulator should set an access price to the new infrastructure that
is positively correlated with the access price to the legacy network, in order to incentivize both the
entrant and the incumbent to invest. However, if the entrant has a larger ber coverage than the
incumbent, the regulator should set a low access price to copper (to level the playing eld) in the
uncovered areas and set a high access price on ber to foster rmsinvestment incentives.
Finally, we extend our analysis to study the case in which the copper network is required to be
7Directive 2009/140/EC ("Better Regulation Directive", recital 7) explicitly considers the possibility of dening
di¤erent geographical markets and remedies according to the prevailing competitive conditions.
8Bourreau et al. (2012) only briey touches this question within a specied competitive setting.
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switched o¤ upon the deployment of ber, and show that this grants the regulator greater exibility
in setting the access price to ber, because the copper switch-o¤ obligation forces migration to ber
at the wholesale level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the model. In Section
3 we study a benchmark with no access to ber. We also study the e¤ect of an upgrade of the
copper network on investment in ber, and consider access price discrimination across di¤erent
areas as an alternative regulatory tool to uniform pricing. In Section 4 we introduce ex-ante access
regulation to the ber network, and study the interplay between two access prices. We also consider
a mandatory switch-o¤ for the copper network. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
2 The setting
We build on the model provided by Bourreau et al. (2012), and consider competition between an
incumbent operator (rm 1) and an entrant operator (rm 2) in the broadband telecommunications
market. At the beginning of the game, both rms rely on the incumbents copper network to provide
broadband services. The entrant leases access to the incumbents copper network (e.g., through
a local loop unbundling o¤er) at the regulated per-unit access price a  0.9 We assume that the
marginal cost of providing access is constant and normalize it to 0.
Both rms sequentially invest in ber networks, and we assume that the incumbent makes its
investment rst.10 When a rm invests in a ber network in a given area, it no longer employs the
copper network to provide broadband services, that is, in that area the new technology replaces
the old one for the rm in question. A rm can also ask for access to its rivals ber infrastructure
at the regulated per-unit access price ea  0.
9The analysis provided by Bourreau et al. (2012), who do not consider regulation of the ber network, constitutes
our benchmark in this paper. We introduce access to ber in Section 4.
10This sequence of moves reects the idea that incumbent rms may have specic advantages in the deployment
of the new infrastructure (due to their control over the existing infrastructure).
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Investment costs. We consider a country composed of a continuum of areas, with a total
size of z. The xed cost of rolling out the ber network varies in di¤erent areas of the country, and
we order the areas (from 0 to z) so that the ranking reects the order of the magnitude of NGN
investment costs (from low to high).
For each rm i = 1; 2, the decision to invest in ber involves setting the areas [0; zi] in which
its ber network will be rolled out, with [0; zi]  [0; z].
The xed cost of covering an area at a given location x 2 [0; z] is denoted by c (x), with c (x) > 0
and c0 (x) > 0, and it is the same for both rms. The total cost of covering the area [0; zi] for rm
i is then C (zi) =
ziZ
0
c (x) dx, and we have C 0 (zi) = c (zi) > 0 and C 00 (zi) = c0 (zi) > 0.
Demand for broadband services. We use the competitive setting provided by Katz and
Shapiro (1985). The indirect utility function of a consumer of type  is U =  + si   pi, where
si and pi denote the quality and price of rm i, with i = 1; 2. Consumerstypes are uniformly
distributed over ( 1; 1].11 Firms set quantities, and we normalize marginal costs to zero. We allow
rms to set di¤erent quantities in di¤erent areas depending on their network technology and that
of their rival. We use the superscripts Oand Nfor the old (copper) and new (ber) networks,
respectively. The prot of rm i = 1; 2 in a given area, gross of investment cost, is denoted by k;li ,
where k; l = O;N refer to the network technology of the incumbent and the entrant, respectively.
We denote by sO and sN the quality of the old copper network and new ber network, respec-
tively. We assume that sN > sO, and that sN < (1 + 5sO)=4, which ensures the coexistence of
both networks in equilibrium (i.e., a rm using the copper network is not evicted by a rm using
a ber network), and that the quality di¤erence is not so high that it would be socially e¢ cient
to close the low-quality network. Finally, we assume that the access prices to the copper and ber
11Allowing for negative values of  avoids corner solutions where all consumers purchase one of the two rms
services.
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networks are not too high so that an access seeker always makes a positive prot in any local area,
gross of investment costs.
The timing. The timing of the game is as follows: The regulator sets the access price on
the copper network, a, and on the ber network, ea (in the benchmark case we consider access to
the copper network only). Then, the incumbent decides on the areas in which to roll-out a ber
network, z1. Having observed the incumbents decision, the entrant decides on its own ber network
coverage, z2. Finally, rms compete in quantities.
3 A benchmark: No access to ber
We start by studying a benchmark case, where there is no access to ber. In any given geographical
area, depending on the investment decisions of the rms for that area and on the access require-
ments set by the regulator, the competitive environment is dened by one of the three following
congurations:
1. Service-based competition within the copper network. Both rms employ the incumbents
copper network to provide broadband services, and obtain gross prots O;Oi , for i = 1; 2.
2. Infrastructure-based competition between the copper and the ber networks. This can happen
under two di¤erent cases:
i. the incumbent uses its copper network, while the entrant employs its own ber network;
they obtain the gross prot O;Ni ;
ii. the incumbent employs its ber network, while the entrant relies on access to the in-
cumbents copper network, and they obtain the gross prot N;Oi .
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3. Infrastructure-based competition between the ber networks. Both rms employ their own
ber network and obtain the gross prot N;Ni .
In our setting, since we limit the quality di¤erence between the copper and ber networks,
conguration (2) is viable, i.e., the legacy and the new network can coexist in a given area.12
In what follows, we start by characterizing the equilibrium coverage as a function of the access
price to the copper network. Then, we study the potential e¤ects of a quality upgrade of the copper
network on investments in ber. Finally, we discuss the impact of a geographical di¤erentiation of
the access price to copper on social welfare.
3.1 Equilibrium ber coverage with no access to ber
The coverage game without access to ber is studied in detail in Bourreau et al. (2012), therefore
we just summarize and discuss here the di¤erent equilibria that can emerge in the sequential game.
The prots in the last stage of the game for each industry conguration (1) to (3) can be found in
Appendix A. When the entrant relies on the incumbents infrastructure to provide its services (i.e.,
in industry congurations (1) and (2.ii)), its prot decreases with the access price a, whereas the
incumbents prot increases with the access price up to the monopoly access price (which we denote
by baO and baN , when the incumbent uses the old and new technology, respectively).13 Finally, the
incumbent makes more prot when the entrant leases access to the copper network (congurations
(1) and (2.ii)) than when the entrant uses its own ber network (congurations (2.i) and (3)).14
In the coverage game, given that the incumbent has covered a certain fraction of a country with
ber, the entrant decides to deploy its own ber network up to the level that maximizes its total
12That is, for i = 1; 2, we have O;Ni > 0, and 
N;O
i (a) > 0 for a not too high.
13See Appendix B1.
14See Appendix B2.
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prot. Assuming that the incumbent has covered the areas [0; z1], the entrants prot is
2(z1; z2) =  C (z2) +
8>><>>:
z2
N;N
2 + (z1   z2)N;O2 (a) + (z   z1)O;O2 (a) if z2  z1
z1
N;N
2 + (z2   z1)O;N2 + (z   z2)O;O2 (a) if z2 > z1
.
The entrant may decide to invest more (i.e., to cover more areas) or less (i.e., to cover less areas)
than the incumbent. The incumbent then reacts to the entrants optimal investment decision by
deciding on the coverage that maximizes its own prot in both scenarios. This sequential coverage
game has two potential asymmetric interior equilibria.15 In the rst asymmetric equilibrium, the
entrant dominates the ber market, that is, the entrant reaches a coverage, zm2 , which is larger than
the incumbents coverage, zc1, with z
m
2 (a) = (c)
 1 (O;N2  O;O2 (a)) and zc1 = (c) 1 (N;N1  O;N1 ). In
the second asymmetric equilibrium, the incumbent invests more in ber coverage than the entrant
and dominates the ber market; the incumbent covers zm1 (a) = (c)
 1 (N;O1 (a) O;O1 (a)), whereas
the entrant covers zc2(a) = (c)
 1 (N;N2   N;O2 (a)), with zm1 > zc2:
Bourreau et al. show in a more general setting that the global ber coverage (which is the total
coverage of the rm that has the largest ber network coverage) can vary non-monotonically with
the access price of the copper network.16 This result is due to the coexistence of three di¤erent
e¤ects: (i) the replacement e¤ect that hinders infrastructure investment by alternative operators
when the access price is low; (ii) the wholesale revenue e¤ect that discourages the incumbent to
invest in a higher quality network when the access price is low (since the entrant may invest in
reaction, and the incumbent will then lose some of its wholesale prots); and nally (iii) the retail-
level migration e¤ect : when the access price to the copper network is low, the retail prices of the
services which rely on the copper network are also low. Therefore, in order to encourage customers
15There is also a potential asymmetric corner equilibrium. However, to simplify the exposition, we focus on the
interior equilibria. Though there are multiple candidate equilibria, the equilibrium is always unique.
16See Proposition 1 in Bourreau et al. (2012).
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to switch from copper to ber, operators should also o¤er low prices for ber services. This e¤ect
reduces the protability of the ber infrastructure, and hence, the incentives to invest in it.
In our setting with a specic demand system, a higher access price leads locally to higher ber
investments as we have @zm1 =@a  0, @zm2 =@a  0, and @zc2=@a  0, while @zc1=@a = 0.17 This
rather intuitive nding is in line with most of the empirical evidence. For example, most recently,
Distaso et al. (2009) found a positive correlation between access prices and the development of
alternative broadband infrastructures.18
3.2 Technological upgrade of the copper network
Bourreau et al. (2012) assume that the quality di¤erence between the old and the next generation
networks is xed. However, recent technologies such as vectoring can improve the speed of
broadband connections provided on the copper network, and hence reduce the quality advantage of
the ber network. Since in many countries the deployment of the vectoring technology is subject
to the regulators authorization, it is interesting to study how the equilibrium investments in ber
coverage would be a¤ected by an exogenous increase in the quality of the copper network, sO. We
have the following result for the two asymmetric equilibria.
Proposition 1 A higher quality of the copper network leads to lower investments in ber coverage.
Proof. See Appendix C.
17This result is provided as an example by Bourreau et al. (2012) in Lemma 4.
18See also Christodoulou and Vlahous (2001), Crandall et al. (2004), Willig (2006), and Waverman et al. (2007).
Christodoulou and Vlahous (2001) analyze the impact of unbundling rates in a simulated context with a mix of
facilities and services competition, and nd that increasing the access rates promotes investment by both historic
operators and entrants. In a similar vein, using data on 15 European countries from 2002 to 2006, Crandall et
al. (2004) nd that access prices that are too low do not encourage new entrants to build their own facilities after
gaining market experience. Willig (2006) nds that a small reduction (1%) in unbundled network elements rates
induces a more than proportional increase in the historic operators investment (2.1% to 2.9%). Waverman et al.
(2007) examine the impact of local loop unbundling prices on alternative infrastructuresmarket share, and nd that
a reduction in the local loop unbundling price causes a more than proportional reduction in the subscribers share of
alternative infrastructures.
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In our setting, a quality upgrade of the copper network generates the following e¤ects: (i) the
above mentioned replacement and wholesale revenue e¤ects are intensied, as both the incumbent
and the entrant make higher prots with the copper network, and (ii) the protability of ber is
decreased, due to a lower quality advantage of ber services over copper network services. Both
of these e¤ects lead to a reduction of investment incentives, and hence rms invest in less ber
coverage when the copper network is upgraded.
From a policy perspective, this result suggests that the regulator has to trade o¤ between
spurring high-speed broadband services via an upgrade of the copper network or the deployment
of ber infrastructures.
3.3 Geographical di¤erentiation of copper access prices
As studied in Bourreau et al. (2012), when determining the access price to the legacy network,
the regulator faces a standard trade-o¤ between static e¢ ciency and investment incentives, but
also a trade-o¤ between the social benets of network expansion and the social costs of duplica-
tion. A single regulatory instrument (i.e., setting a uniform access price to the legacy network) is
insu¢ cient to overcome the tension between the potentially conicting three regulatory objec-
tives: (i) achieving static e¢ ciency in uncovered (or partially covered) areas, (ii) providing rms
with appropriate investment incentives, and (iii) setting right the frontier between the areas with
two competing ber infrastructures and the areas with a monopoly ber infrastructure (i.e., the
appropriate level of infrastructure duplication).
One potential solution would be to allow the regulator to set di¤erent access prices for copper,19
depending on whether there is infrastructure competition between di¤erent technological (copper
and ber) networks. In our framework, this di¤erentiation of access prices matters only when the
19Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012b) study geographical access rules that apply to the ber network, without
considering access to copper.
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incumbent dominates NGN investments, and we therefore focus on this case.20
Let aO and aN denote the access prices for the areas with no ber network (i.e., conguration
(1)) and with a single ber network (i.e., conguration (2)), respectively. The expressions for social
welfare in local areas are provided in Appendix D, where we also prove that dwO;O=daO < 0 and
dwN;O=daN < 0. The coverage game with di¤erentiated access prices is solved in Appendix E.
In what follows, we rst determine the (local) social optimum in terms of coverage and access
prices when the incumbent dominates ber investments, and then study whether the regulator can
implement the social optimum with di¤erentiated access prices.
The social optimum when the incumbent dominates ber investment. Assume that
rm 1 and rm 2s coverage, z1w and z2w, are set by the regulator, together with the di¤erentiated
access prices, aOw and a
N
w , with z1w  z2w. The subscript "w" stands for the welfare-maximizing
solution. The social welfare is given by
W = z2ww
N;N + (z1w   z2w)wN;O
 
aNw

+ (z   z1w)wO;O
 
aOw
  C (z1w)  C (z2w) .
Assuming an interior solution, the local social optimum is then obtained when21
@W
@aOw
=
dwO;O
daOw
= 0, (1)
@W
@aNw
=
dwN;O
daNw
= 0, (2)
20When the entrant dominates NGN investments, it leases access to the copper network only in the areas where
the incumbent also uses the copper technology. There is therefore no room for di¤erentiation of the access price. See
also Appendix E where we determine the coverage equilibrium, and show that when the entrant dominates, coverage
depends only on the access charge in uncovered areas.
21We focus on the conguration where the incumbent invests more in ber than the entrant. Note however that
the global social optimum can be achieved with a conguration where the incumbent does not dominate NGN
investment.
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@W
@z1w
= wN;O
 
aNw
  wO;O  aOw  c (z1w) = 0, (3)
and
@W
@z2w
= wN;N   wN;O  aNw   c (z2w) = 0. (4)
Equations (1) and (2) state that the access prices aOw and a
N
w should be set so as to maximize local
welfare in areas of type (1) and (2ii), respectively. Since dwO;O=daO < 0 and dwN;O=daN < 0, and
since we have assumed positive access prices, this is achieved when aOw = 0 and a
N
w = 0 (access
prices are bounded at zero, which represents the marginal cost due to our normalization).
Equation (3) states that the total ber coverage, z1w, should be set such that welfare in areas
with a single ber infrastructure equates the cost of building this infrastructure plus the opportunity
social cost (i.e., local welfare with service-based competition on copper).
Finally, equation (4) means that the coverage of the small network, z2w, should be set such
that the welfare gain of having competition between ber infrastructures instead of a single ber
infrastructure equates the cost of duplicating infrastructure.
Can di¤erentiated access prices achieve the social optimum? We now determine
whether the regulator can implement the social optimum dened above with di¤erentiated ac-
cess prices, when ber coverage is determined by the market outcome. In this case, for given access
prices aO and aN , the social welfare is
W = zc2
 
aN

wN;N +
 
zm1
 
aO; aN
  zc2  aNwN;O  aN+  z   zm1  aO; aNwO;O  aO (5)
 C  zm1  aO; aN  C  zc2  aN .
The rst component in (5) represents the welfare in areas with two competing ber infrastructures.
The second component is the welfare in areas with a single infrastructure and the third term the
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welfare in areas with no ber infrastructure.
The two rst order derivatives of welfare with respect to aO and aN are22
@W
@aO
=
@zm1
@aO|{z}
( )
 
wN;O
 
aN
  wO;O  aO  c  zm1  aO; aN| {z }
(+) or ( )
+ (z   zm1 )
dwO;O
daO| {z }
( )
, (6)
and
@W
@aN
=
dzc2
daN|{z}
(+)
 
wN;N   wN;O  aN  c  zc2  aN| {z }
( )
+
@zm1
@aN| {z }
(+)
 
wN;O
 
aN
  wO;O  aO  c (zm1 )| {z }
(+) or ( )
(7)
+(zm1   zc2)
dwN;O
daN| {z }
( )
.
Equation (6) shows that the regulator can set aO to achieve a maximum per-area welfare in un-
covered areas (i.e., aO = 0), and then it could set aN to achieve a socially optimal global ber
network coverage (i.e., by choosing aN such that wN;O
 
aN
   wO;O  aO   c (zm1 ) = 0).23 That
is, the regulator can solve the conict between static e¢ ciency in uncovered areas and incentives
to invest in a monopoly ber infrastructure. However, as equation (7) clearly shows, by setting
such values for aO and aN , the regulator will not be able to maximize static e¢ ciency in partially
covered areas (the last term of the equation) and to set the right incentives to duplicate an existing
ber infrastructure (the rst term in the equation) or only by chance. Therefore, geographical
di¤erentiation of access prices fails to resolve completely the tension between the three regulatory
objectives. We can therefore state the following result.
Proposition 2 When the incumbent dominates ber investments, di¤erentiating the copper access
22See Appendix F for the signs of the di¤erent terms in (6) and (7).
23When aN is very small, wN;O(aN ) is high and c(zm1 ) is small as there is little investment. Therefore, w
N;O(aN ) 
wO;O(aO) c(zm1 ) is likely to be positive. Conversely, when aN is high, wN;O(aN ) is low and c(zm1 ) is high. Therefore,
wN;O(aN ) wO;O(aO)  c(zm1 ) is likely to be negative. Since wN;O(aN ) wO;O(aO)  c(zm1 ) decreases with aN , it is
possible to nd the aN that makes it equal to zero.
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price in areas with competing ber infrastructures and areas with a single ber infrastructure is not
enough to achieve the social optimum.
Although geographical di¤erentiation of access prices is not a miracle solution, it outperforms
uniform access pricing. Equation (6) suggests that the regulator should set a cost oriented access
price to copper in areas with no ber infrastructure (i.e., a zero access price in our setting due
to our normalization), and an above-cost access price to copper network in areas with a ber
infrastructure. At the end of Section 4, we provide a numerical example for di¤erentiated access
prices, and compare the market outcome with this access scheme to the outcome with alternative
access schemes.
4 Access to ber
In many European countries (such as France, Italy, Germany and Spain), access to ber ducts is
mandated and subject to ex ante control.24 In this section we therefore introduce access to ber,
and analyze the interplay between the regulation of access to the copper network and to the ber
network. We consider a symmetric regulation, where both the incumbent and the entrant are
required to provide access to their ber networks at a regulated price, ea.25
On top of the three industry congurations we have listed in our benchmark case, a fourth
conguration is now possible:
4. Service-based competition within the ber network. Both rms use the same ber network to
compete. Depending on the investment decisions, the network can be owned by the incumbent
or the entrant, whereby the owner of the network provides access to the other rm at price ea.
24See Cullen International (2012).
25Access is required in the areas where a rm holds a monopoly in the NGN. For example, for a given location
where the incumbent has NGN coverage, the incumbent is required to provide to access to the entrant only if the
entrant has no NGN coverage in that area.
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Let eN;Ni (ea) and N;Nj (ea) denote rm is prot when it provides access to its ber network to
rm j 6= i and rm js prot when it leases access to rm is ber network, respectively. We nd
that @eN;Ni (ea) =@ea  0 for ea not too high, and that @N;Nj (ea) =@ea  0.26 In words, provided that
the access price of the ber is not too high, the gross prots of the rm that owns the ber network
increase with the access price, whereas the opposite is true for the rm that acquires access.
We assume that the access price for ber is low enough so that the rm that invests less in
ber is always willing to switch from copper to ber at the wholesale level, which we refer to as
the wholesale migration condition. Formally, this is the case if ea  eamax1 = sN   sO when the
entrant dominates ber coverage, and if ea  eamax2 (a) = sN   sO + a when it is the incumbent that
dominates. For the rest of the analysis, we assume that ea  min feamax1 ;eamax2 (a)g = sN   sO, that
is, the regulated access price to the ber network is not too high, so that there is always access to
a monopoly ber infrastructure (rather than to the copper infrastructure).
We determine the entrants and the incumbents optimal investment decisions in Appendix G2.
We now rst characterize the socially-optimal access price for ber as a function of the access price
for copper. Then, we discuss how a switch-o¤ of the copper network would a¤ect ber equilibrium
coverage.
4.1 Socially optimal access price to the ber network
We analyze the regulators choice of the access price for ber, and the relationship between the
socially optimal ber access price and the access price to copper.
If the incumbent dominates ber coverage, the equilibrium coverage are z1 = ezm1 (a;ea) and
26See Appendix G1.
17
z2 = ezc2 (ea). The social welfare is then
W = ezc2 (ea)wN;N + (ezm1 (a;ea)  ezc2 (ea))wN;N (ea) + (z   ezm1 (a;ea))wO;O (a)  C (ezm1 )  C (ezc2) .
In Appendix G3, we show that in this case there is a positive relationship between the socially
optimal ea and the access price of the legacy network, i.e., deaw=da  0, if wN;N (ea)   wO;O (a)  
c (ezm1 )  0.27
On the other hand, if the entrant invests in larger ber coverage than the incumbent, the
equilibrium coverage are z1 = ezc1 (ea) and z2 = ezm2 (a;ea), and the social welfare is
W = ezc1wN;N + (ezm2   ezc1)wN;N (ea) + (z   ezm2 )wO;O (a)  C (ezc1)  C (ezm2 ) .
We nd that the relationship between eaw and a can be reversed, that is, we can have deaw=da  0.28
The following gure provides an illustration, when C (z) = kz2=2, z = 4, k = 0:3, sO = 1 and
sN = 1:4. For low values of the copper access a, the incumbent invests more in equilibrium, and
we nd that the ber access price increases with a. For higher values of a (but lower than 0.35), it
is the entrant that invests more, and eaw decreases with a.29
27Note that this result holds if the marginal investment cost is convex, and it does not necessarily hold when the
marginal investment cost is concave.
28This holds when the marginal investment cost is convex. See Appendix G3 for the formal proofs.
29When a > 0:35, we have a corner (non-interior) equilibrium where the incumbent invests more. In this case, we
nd that eaw rst increases then decreases with a.
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Fig. 1: Socially-optimal ber access price as a function of the copper access price
The intuition for this di¤erence between the cases when the incumbent or the entrant dominates
investment in ber is as follows. The copper network access price a¤ects the trade-o¤ for the
regulator between setting a high ber access price, which increases marginally ber coverage, and
setting a low ber network access price, which limits the deadweight loss in the areas with a
monopoly ber infrastructure. How the copper network access price a¤ects the regulators trade-
o¤ between a low and a high ber network access price depends on whether it is the incumbent or
the entrant that owns the ber infrastructure subject to access.
When the incumbent owns the monopoly ber infrastructure, raising the access price to the
copper network has three e¤ects, which all gives an incentive to the regulator to increase the ber
access price. First, a higher copper access price reduces the size of the area with a monopoly
ber infrastructure, as it intensies the wholesale revenue e¤ect, hence reducing the incumbents
investment incentives. This, in turn, reduces the deadweight loss associated to a high ber access
price in the areas with the monopoly ber network.
Second, a higher copper access price reduces welfare in the areas not covered by a ber network.
Hence, the regulator has an incentive to expand the areas covered with ber, and to reduce the
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uncovered areas where retail prices tend to increase. Third, the frontier between the uncovered
areas and the areas with a monopoly ber infrastructure becomes more sensitive to the ber access
price; this also gives an incentive to the regulator to increase the ber access price to encourage
investment. All in all, when the incumbent is the leaderin the deployment of ber, the socially
optimal access price to ber is positively related to the copper access price.
When the entrant owns the monopoly ber infrastructure, a higher copper access price increases
the entrants investment incentives because the replacement e¤ect is softened. Since the size of the
areas with the monopoly ber network increases, the regulator has an incentive to lower the ber
access price to reduce the deadweight loss in these areas. At the same time, the marginal gain
of rolling out a ber network in uncovered areas can either increase or decrease, which gives the
incentive to the regulator to either increase or decrease the ber access price.
Finally, the frontier between the uncovered areas and the areas with a monopoly ber network
becomes less sensitive to the ber access price, which gives an incentive to the regulator to decrease
this price. In sum, when the copper access price increases, the regulator should either lower or
increase the ber access price. Hence, the relation between the socially optimal ber access price
and the copper access price can be negative, when the entrant is the leaderin ber investments.
Comparing di¤erent access schemes. Finally, we analyze how the di¤erent access schemes
that we have considered in this paper (uniform access price, di¤erentiated access prices, copper and
ber access prices) compare in terms of equilibrium coverage and welfare. The following table gives
the equilibrium coverage and welfare for the following parameter values, z = 4, k = 0:3, sO = 1,
and for various values of sN (that satisfy our assumptions).30
The table shows that ber coverage and welfare are lower with a uniform access price than with
30We obtained similar results with other values for z. Note that k plays a limited role in these simulations; it is
mainly a scaling factor for the equilibrium investments.
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a more sophisticated access scheme (di¤erentiated access prices, or access to ber on top of access
to copper). This is because, with a uniform access price, the regulator is very much constrained
in setting the uniform access price: it has to be low enough in the areas with an incumbent ber
infrastructure for the entrant to have a positive prot in these areas. The regulator therefore
cannot use it to spur investment. This constraint is lifted when there is access price di¤erentiation
(either geographical di¤erentiated access prices or ber access). Having di¤erentiated access prices
provides the regulator with greater exibility in setting the access terms, which increases investment
and welfare substantially.
Uniform Di¤erentiation Access to ber
sN = 1:1 Access scheme a = 0 aO = 0:00 , aN = 0:00 a = 0:00 , ea = 0:06
z1 0.047 0.310 0.380
z2 0.044 0.296 0.180
W 7.115 7.139 7.151
sN = 1:2 Access scheme a = 0 aO = 0:00 , aN = 0:03 a = 0:00 , ea = 0:13
z1 0.098 0.590 0.800
z2 0.089 0.652 0.400
W 7.129 7.228 7.278
sN = 1:3 Access scheme a = 0 aO = 0:00 , aN = 0:07 a = 0:00 , ea = 0:20
z1 0.153 0.890 1.260
z2 0.133 1.020 0.620
W 7.153 7.388 7.838
In our simulations, the best scenario in terms of global coverage and welfare is with access to
ber. Fiber access turns out to be a more powerful instrument than geographical di¤erentiation of
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access, because the former access scheme operates also when the entrant invests more in ber than
the incumbent.
Finally, note that we cannot have di¤erentiated access prices together with ber access. When
there is access to ber, there is no access to the copper network in an area where the incumbent
has invested in ber while the entrant has not. In this case, indeed, the entrant uses ber access
rather than copper access (i.e., migration takes place at the wholesale level).
4.2 Switching o¤ the legacy network
So far, we have considered that the incumbent can continue to provide access to its copper network,
while providing its services over a higher quality ber network (industry conguration (2.ii)). In
some European countries, however, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, there is an on-going
debate on whether the incumbents that move from copper to ber should be imposed to switch
o¤their legacy network, i.e., to provide access to their higher quality ber network only.
In order to study the e¤ect of switching o¤ the copper network, we focus on the candidate
equilibrium where the incumbent invests more than the entrant, and has to provide access to its ber
network in the areas where the entrant has not rolled out a ber network (industry conguration
(4) with incumbents dominance).31
In our setting, switching o¤ the copper network has mainly an e¤ect on the wholesale migration
condition, which becomes N;N2 (ea)  0. Due to the switch-o¤ of the copper network, if the entrant
does not acquire access to ber, it earns zero prot. Therefore, as switching o¤ the copper network
forces the migration at the wholesale level, the regulator has greater exibility for setting the ber
access price. However, the rest of our analysis applies, and in particular, the relation between the
socially optimal ber access price and the copper access price remains the same.
31The switch-o¤ does not occur in the asymmetric equilibrium where the entrant dominates NGN coverage, as the
incumbent does not own any monopoly NGN infrastructure in this candidate equilibria.
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5 Conclusion
This paper studies the e¤ect of access regulation on the incentives to migrate from the legacy
(copper) networks to the next generation (ber) networks. We build on our companion paper
(Bourreau et al., 2012) to address new and policy relevant regulatory issues. More specically,
we analyze the e¤ect of three di¤erent kinds of regulatory measures: First, geographical access
regulation of copper networks  where access prices to copper are di¤erentiated depending on
whether or not an alternative ber network has been deployed; second, access obligations on ber
networks and its interplay with wholesale copper prices; and, nally, a mandatory switch-o¤ of the
legacy copper network to foster the transition on the higher quality ber network.
We show that when setting the access price to the legacy network, the regulator must take into
account potential conicts between investment incentives, static e¢ ciency in uncovered areas, and
excessive duplication of infrastructure costs. Introducing di¤erent copper network access prices for
uncovered areas and partially covered areas (i.e., with a single ber network), instead of using a
simple uniform access regime all over a country, solves some of these conicts, but not all.
We also point out the e¤ects that emerge when both the old and the new infrastructures are
subject to ex ante intervention. Interestingly, our results highlight that regulators cannot treat
the access prices to the two di¤erent technologies independently. When the incumbent has larger
ber coverage than the entrant, the regulator has to set an access price to the new infrastructure
that is positively correlated with the access price to the legacy network. Hence, if the regulator
wants to keep the access prices to the copper network relatively low, in order to favor migration
at wholesale level (and in turn at the retail level), it also must set a relatively low access price
to the ber network. Whereas the reverse can be true if the entrant has larger ber coverage
than the incumbent: given the relative advantage the incumbent enjoys due to its control over
the legacy network, it could be socially optimal for the regulator to set a low access price to the
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copper network to level the playing eld between the two competitors in the uncovered areas,
but also to set a higher access price to the ber infrastructure controlled by the entrant in order to
incentivize investment by both the entrant and the incumbent. This interplay remains unchanged
even if the regulator introduces a mandatory switch-o¤ of the copper network to foster migration
at the wholesale level.
In policy terms, our result suggests that to the extent that the access price to the legacy network
a¤ects investments in ber by both the incumbent and the entrant, the regulation of access to ber
should be somehow asymmetric, that is, access prices to incumbentsand entrantsber networks
should be set following di¤erent principles, according to the relative market position (in terms of
ber coverage) of each competitor.
An interesting extension of our analysis might be the introduction of competition between
ultra-fast networks at both the retail and the wholesale level, due to the presence for example
of alternative access technologies such as cable TV, as it happens in some European countries as
Belgium and Switzerland. The existence of a technological bypass can a¤ect the way in which
a regulator sets access prices to copper and ber networks. Investors might also be non-prot
companies: in several countries, the main investors in NGANs are state-owned companies, in
competition or in cooperation with the incumbent operator. This for example happens in Australia,
New Zealand and in Italy. The role of state ownership on the migration to ultra-fast broadband
networks is relevant per se, but we leave this analysis - as well as the previous one - to future
research.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Per-area prots
We denote by s1 and s2 the qualities o¤ered by rm 1 and rm 2, respectively, with si 2

sO; sN
	
,
for i = 1; 2. We provide below the equilibrium per-area prots in the four possible industry
congurations.
(1) Service-based competition within the copper network. We have s1 = s2 = sO. The
incumbents prot is O;O1 = p1q1 + aq2, and the entrants prot is 
O;O
2 = (p2   a)q2. In the
equilibrium of the quantity-setting game, we have
O;O1 (a) =
1
9
 
(1 + sO)2 + 5a (1  a) + 5asO and O;O2 (a) = (1 + sO   2a)29 .
Note that O;O2 (a)  0 if and only if a  aO =
 
1 + sO

=2. Besides, the incumbents gross prot
is maximized at baO = argmax
a
O;O1 (a) = (1 + s
O)=2 = aO.
(2) Infrastructure-based competition between the copper and the ber networks.
i. The incumbent uses its copper network and the entrant uses its own ber net-
work. We have s1 = sO and s2 = sN . The incumbents prot is 
O;N
1 = p1q1, and the entrants
prot is O;N2 = p2q2. In equilibrium, we have
O;N1 =
(1 + 2sO   sN )2
9
and O;N2 =
(1 + 2sN   sO)2
9
.
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ii. The incumbent uses a ber network and the entrant uses the incumbents copper
network. We have s1 = sN and s2 = sO. The incumbents prot is 
N;O
1 = p1q1 + aq2, and the
entrants prot is N;O2 = (p2   a)q2. In equilibrium, we have
N;O1 (a) =
(1 + 2sN   sO)2 + 5a (1  a) + a(sN + 4sO)
9
and N;O2 (a) =
(1 + 2sO   sN   2a)2
9
.
Note that N;O2 (a)  0 if and only if a  aN =
 
1 + 2sO   sN =2, and that aN < aO as sN > sO.
The incumbents gross prot is maximized at baN = argmax
a
N;O1 (a) = (5 + s
N + 4sO)=10 > aN .
(3) Infrastructure-based competition between the ber networks. We have s1 = s2 = sN .
The incumbents prot is N;N1 = p1q1, and the entrants prot is 
N;N
2 = p2q2. In equilibrium, we
have
N;N1 =
(1 + sN )2
9
and N;N2 =
(1 + sN )2
9
.
Appendix B: Per-area prot properties
B1: From the expressions of prots given in Appendix A, we have @k;O2 (a) =@a  0, for k = O;N .
Furthermore, O;O1 (a) increases with a, for all a  baO = aO. Similarly, N;O1 (a) increases with a, for
all a  aN < baN , as we have @2N;O1 (a) =@a2 < 0 and @N;O1 (a) =@a  a = aN = 2  sN   sO =3 > 0.
B2: First, since O;O1 (a) increases with a for a  baO = aO, we have O;O1 (a)  O;O1 (0) = 
1 + sO
2
=9. Since sO < sN , we have O;N1 <
 
1 + sO
2
=9, and hence, O;O1 (a) > 
O;N
1 for
all a. Second, since N;O1 (a) increases with a for all a  aN , we have N;O1 (a)  N;O1 (0) =
(1 + 2sN   sO)2=9. As sN > sO, we then have N;O1 (a) > (1 + sN )2=9 = N;N1 .
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Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 1
We study the e¤ect of a higher quality for the copper network, sO, on rmsinvestment in ber.
We focus on the two asymmetric equilibria, fzm2 ; zc1g if the entrant dominates in NGN investment,
and fzm1 ; zc2g if it is the incumbent that dominates. We nd that zc1, zm1 , zm2 , and zc2 decrease with
the quality of the copper network, sO. Indeed,
@zc1
@sO
=
@(N;N1   O;N1 )
@sO
=  4
9
(1 + 2sO   sN )  0,
since sN < 1 + 2sO from our assumptions,
@zm1
@sO
=
@(N;O1   O;O1 )
@sO
=  1
9
 
a+ 4 + 4sN
  0,
@zm2
@sO
=
@(O;N2   O;O2 )
@sO
=  4
9
 
1 + sN   a  0,
as a  aO and sN > sO, and
@zc2
@sO
=
@(N;N2   N;O2 )
@sO
=  4
9
 
1 + 2sO   sN   2a  0,
since a  aN .
Appendix D: Social welfare in local areas
D1: Expressions for social welfare. Recall that s1 and s2 are the qualities o¤ered by rm 1
and rm 2, respectively. Consumer surplus is given by
CS =
Z 1
e (   bp) d ,
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where bp = p1  s1 = p2  s2 is the quality-adjusted price in the equilibrium of the quantity-setting
subgame, and e = bp is the marginal consumer. We nd that CS = (2 + s1 + s2   a)2 =18. The
local social welfare is w = CS + 1 + 2, and we nd that
w =
(4 + 4s2 + a) (2 + 2s2   a)
18
+
11
18
(s1   s2)2 + 4
9
(a+ 1 + s2) (s1   s2) .
D2: Variations of local welfare with the copper access price When there is service-based
competition within the copper network, we have s1 = s2 = sO, and we nd that
@wO;O
@a
=  a+ 1 + s
O
9
< 0.
When rm 1 uses a ber network and rm 2 uses the copper network, we have s1 = sN and s2 = sO,
and we nd that
@wN;O
@a
=  a+ 1 + 5s
O   4sN
9
< 0,
as 1 + 5sO   4sN > 0 under our assumptions on sN .
Appendix E: Equilibrium coverage with di¤erentiated copper access prices
We begin by determining the entrants optimal investment decision for a given coverage set by the
incumbent, and then we solve for the coverage equilibrium.
The entrants investment decision. Assume that rm 1 has covered the areas [0; z1]. Firm
2s prot is then given by
2(z1; z2) =  C (z2) +
8>><>>:
z2
N;N
2 + (z1   z2)N;O2
 
aN

+ (z   z1)O;O2
 
aO

if z2  z1
z1
N;N
2 + (z2   z1)O;N2 + (z   z2)O;O2
 
aO

if z2 > z1
.
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Similar to Bourreau et al. (2012), we dene
zc2
 
aN

= (c) 1

N;N2   N;O2
 
aN

, and zm2
 
aO

= (c) 1

O;N2   O;O2
 
aO

.
Note that depending on the values of aO and aN we can have either zm2 (a
O) > zc2(a
N ) or the
opposite. If the entrant has higher incentives to invest in the ber when the incumbent has not
invested in a given area, (i.e., zm2 > z
c
2) the best-response of the entrant is dened by
zBR2 (z1) =
8>><>>:
zm2
 
aO

if z1  bz1
zc2
 
aN

if z1 > bz1 ,
where bz1  aO; aN 2 [zc2; zm2 ] is the lowest z1 such that 2  z1; zc2  aN  2  z1; zm2  aO. This
case is referred to as the entrant conquestsin Bourreau et al. (2012).
If the entrant invests only in the areas where the incumbent has already invested, (i.e., zc2  zm2 ),
its best-response is
zBR2 (z1) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
zm2
 
aO

if z1  zm2
z1 if zm2 < z1  zc2
zc2
 
aN

if z1 > zc2
.
This case is referred to as "the entrant follows suit" in Bourreau et al. (2012).
The incumbents investment decision. The prots of the incumbent in both cases are as
follows. When the entrant conquests(i.e., zc2 < z
m
2 ), rm 1s prot is given by:
1(z1; z
BR
2 (z1)) =  C (z1)+
8>><>>:
z1
N;N
1 + (z
m
2   z1)O;N1 + (z   zm2 )O;O1
 
aO

if z1 2 [0; bz1]
zc2
N;N
1 + (z1   zc2)N;O1
 
aN

+ (z   z1)O;O1
 
aO

if z1 2 [bz1; z] .
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When the entrant follows suit(i.e., zc2  zm2 ), rm 1s prot is given by
1(z1; z
BR
2 (z1)) =  C (z1)+
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
z1
N;N
1 + (z
m
2   z1)O;N1 + (z   zm2 )O;O1
 
aO

if z1 2 [0; zm2 ]
z1
N;N
1 + (z   z1)O;O1
 
aO

if z1 2 [zm2 ; zc2]
zc2
N;N
1 + (z1   zc2)N;O1
 
aN

+ (z   z1)O;O1
 
aO

if z1 2 [zc2; z]
.
Let zc1 = (c)
 1 (N;N1   O;N1 ), and zm1
 
aO; aN

= (c) 1 (N;O1
 
aN
   O;O1  aO). When the
entrant conquestsand when it follows suit, we have the same two potential asymmetric equi-
libria as in the case with uniform access pricing, and either the incumbent or the entrant domi-
nates the ber investments. That is, the equilibrium coverage is either

zm1
 
aO; aN

; zc2
 
aN
	
or
zc1; z
m
2 (a
O)
	
).32
Appendix F: Sign of rst-order derivatives of welfare
(i) @zm1 =@a
O < 0, @zm1 =@a
N > 0 and dzc2=da
N > 0. Since N;O1
 
aN

increases with aN and
O;O1
 
aO

increases with aO, we have @zm1 =@a
O < 0 and @zm1 =@a
N > 0. Since N;O2
 
aN

decreases
with aN , then dzc2=da
N > 0.
(ii) wN;O

/aN

  wO;O  aO  c (zm1 ) can be either positive or negative. From the de-
nition of zm1 , we have c (z
m
1 ) = 
N;O
1
 
aN
  O;O1  aO. We nd that
1(a
O; aN ) = wN;O
 
aN
  wO;O  aO  N;O1  aN  O;O1  aO
=
3
 
aN
2   3  aO2 + 2aN  sN   3sO   2+  sN   sO2 + 4aO  1 + sO
6
.
32As in the baseline model, there is also a corner asymmetric equilibrium. We focus however on the interior
equilibria.
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We have 1(a; a) = (sN   sO)(sN   sO + 2a)=6 > 0. However, we can have 1(aO; aN ) < 0 too.
For example, assume that sO = 1, sN = 1:2, then 1(0; 0:2) < 0.
(iii) wN;N   wN;O  aN   c (zc2) < 0. From the denition of zc2, we have c (zc2) = N;N2  
N;O2
 
aN

. We nd that
wN;N   wN;O  aN  N;N2   N;O2  aN = 16 3(aN )2   2aN  1 + sO   sN   sO2  2.
2 is a second-degree polynomial with an inverted bell-shape, and we have @2=@aN

aN=0
< 0
and 2
 
aN = 0

< 0. Besides, we have 2
 
aN = aN

< 0. Therefore, 2 < 0 always holds, and
hence, wN;N   wN;O  aN  c (zc2) < 0.
Appendix G: Access to ber
G1: Prots with access to ber. When one rm (rm 1 or rm 2) leases access to the ber
network of its rival, both rms o¤er services of quality sN . Let rm i be the access provider, and
rm j 6= i be the access seeker, with i; j = 1; 2. In the equilibrium of the quantity-setting game, we
nd that
eN;Ni (ea) = (1 + sN )2 + 5ea(1 + sN   ea)9 , and N;Nj (ea) =
 
1 + sN   2ea2
9
.
Firm j has a positive demand if ea  (1+sN )=2. We nd that @eN;Ni (ea) =@ea  0 for ea  (1+sN )=2,
and that @N;Nj (ea) =@ea  0.
G2: Equilibrium of the coverage game. We determine the equilibrium of the coverage game
when there is access to ber. We start by determining the entrants optimal coverage decision, and
then solve for the equilibrium.
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The entrants investment decision. Given rm 1s coverage z1, rm 2s prot is
e2 (z1; z2) =
8>><>>:
z2
N;N
2 + (z1   z2)N;N2 (ea) + (z   z1)O;O2 (a)  C (z2) if z2  z1
z1
N;N
2 + (z2   z1) eN;N2 (ea) + (z   z2)O;O2 (a)  C (z2) if z2 > z1 .
We dene ezc2 and ezm2 as the values of z2 that maximize the rst and second lines of e2 (z1; z2), re-
spectively, for z2 2 [0; z]. We have ezc2 (ea) = (c) 1 (N;N2  N;N2 (ea)) and ezm2 (a;ea) = (c) 1 (eN;N2 (ea) 
O;O2 (a)).
Since the wholesale migration condition holds, we have N;N2 (ea)  N;O2 (a), which implies
that ezc2 (ea)  zc2 (a). In other words, introducing an access o¤er on the monopoly ber network
increases the replacement e¤ect for the entrant, which in turn decreases its investment incentives.
Additionally, we have ezm2 (a;ea)  zm2 (a) as eN;N2 (ea)  O;N2 for all ea  eamax1 . Finally, we have
@ezc2=@ea, @ezm2 =@ea, @ezm2 =@a  0. That is, increasing the access price to the copper network or to the
ber network increases ber coverage. The entrants best-response function is then
ezBR2 (z1) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
ezm2 if z1  ezm2 (a;ea)
z1 if ezm2 (a;ea) < z1  ezc2 (ea)
ezc2 if z1 > ezc2 (ea)
and ezBR2 (z1) =
8>><>>:
ezm2 if z1  ez1 (a;ea)
ezc2 if z1 > ez1 (a;ea)
for ezc2 > ezm2 and ezc2  ezm2 , respectively, where ez1 (a;ea) is the lowest z1 such that e2 (z1; ezc2 (ea)) 
e2 (z1; ezm2 (a;ea)) holds.
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The incumbents investment decision. Consider the case where ezc2 > ezm2 . Firm 1s prot
is
e1(z1; ezBR2 (z1)) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
z1
N;N
1 + (ezm2   z1)N;N1 (ea) + (z   ezm2 )O;O1 (a)  C (z1) if z1 2 [0; ezm2 ]
z1
N;N
1 + (z   z1)O;O1 (a)  C (z1) if z1 2 [ezm2 ; ezc2]
ezc2N;N1 + (z1   ezc2) eN;N1 (ea) + (z   z1)O;O1 (a)  C (z1) if z1 2 [ezc2; z]
.
Let ezc1, ezd1 and ezm1 denote the maxima of the rst, second, and third lines of e1(z1; ezBR2 (z1)),
respectively, for z1 2 [0; z]. Firm 1s prot can be written in a similar way for ezc2  ezm2 , which yields
three maxima for di¤erent ranges of values for z1.
Note that with the introduction of the ber access o¤er, the retail-level migration e¤ect (which
is present in determining zm1 in the absence of ber regulation) disappears. Indeed, migration now
takes place at the wholesale level, through the entrants switch to the ber access o¤er, which
automatically triggers migration at the retail level.
Finally, similar to the baseline setting, we have two potential asymmetric equilibria, one in
which the incumbent invests more than the entrant (fezm1 ; ezc2g), and one where it is the entrant that
invests more (fezc1; ezm2 g).
G3: Regulators choice of the access price to ber. To begin with, we consider the case
where the incumbent invests more than the entrant. The equilibrium coverage are then z1 =
ezm1 (a;ea) and z2 = ezc2 (ea), and the social welfare is
W = ezc2 (ea)wN;N + (ezm1 (a;ea)  ezc2 (ea))wN;N (ea) + (z   ezm1 (a;ea))wO;O (a)  C (ezm1 )  C (ezc2) .
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Assuming an interior solution, the socially optimal access price to ber solves
@W
@ea = dezc2 (ea)dea  wN;N   wN;N (ea)  c (ezc2)+ @ezm1 (a;ea)@ea  wN;N (ea)  wO;O (a)  c (ezm1 )
+(ezm1   ezc2) dwN;N (ea)dea  G (a;ea) = 0.
Let eaw denote the solution of G (a;eaw) = 0. From the implicit function theorem, provided that the
second-order condition holds, the sign of @eaw=@a has the same sign as @2W=@ea@a. We nd that
sign

@eaw
@a

= sign

@2W
@ea@a

= sign

@2ezm1 (a;ea)
@ea@a  wN;N (ea)  wO;O (a)  c (ezm1 )
 @ezm1 (a;ea)
@ea

dwO;O (a)
da
+
@ezm1
@a
c0 (ezm1 )+
+
@ezm1
@a
dwN;N (ea)
dea

.
The second term is positive as @ezm1 =@ea  0, dwO;O (a) =da  0, @ezm1 =@a  0 and c0 (z)  0. The
third term is also positive as @ezm1 =@a  0 and dwN;N (ea) =dea  0. If wN;N (ea) wO;O (a) c (ezm1 )  0,
the rst term is positive if @2ezm1 (a;ea) = @ea@a  0. We nd that
@2ezm1 (a;ea)
@ea@a =
@eN;N1
@ea @O;O1@a c00
h
(c) 1
eN;N1   O;O1 i
c0
h
(c) 1
eN;N1   O;O1 i3  0,
as @eN;N1 =@ea  0, @O;O1 =@a  0, and c0  0, and provided that c00  0 (i.e., the investment cost is
convex). It follows that @eaw=@a  0. Finally, if wN;N (ea)  wO;O (a)  c (ezm1 ) < 0, the rst term is
negative and therefore, the sign of @eaw=@a is ambiguous.
Now, we consider the case where the entrant invests more than the incumbent; the equilibrium
coverage are z1 = ezc1 (ea) and z2 = ezm2 (a;ea). The social welfare is
W = ezc1wN;N + (ezm2   ezc1)wN;N (ea) + (z   ezm2 )wO;O (a)  C (ezc1)  C (ezm2 ) .
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Assuming an interior solution, the socially optimal access price to ber solves the rst-order con-
dition
@W
@ea = dezc1 (ea)dea  wN;N   wN;N (ea)  c (ezc1 (ea))+ @ezm2 (a;ea)@ea  wN;N (ea)  wO;O (a)  c (ezm2 )
+(ezm2   ezc1) dwN;N (ea)dea  H (a;ea) = 0.
Let eaw denote the solution of H (a;eaw) = 0. From the implicit function theorem, provided that the
second-order condition holds, the sign of @eaw=@a has the same sign as @2W=@ea@a. We nd that
sign

@eaw
@a

= sign

@2W
@ea@a

= sign

@2ezm2 (a;ea)
@ea@a  wN;N (ea)  wO;O (a)  c (ezm2 )
 @ezm2 (a;ea)
@ea

dwO;O (a)
da
+
@ezm2
@a
c0 (ezm2 )+
+
@ezm2
@a
dwN;N (ea)
dea

.
As @ezm2 =@ea  0, the second term is negative if dwO;O (a) =da+ @ezm2 =@a  c0 (ezm2 )  0, and we
assume that this is the case (note that dwO;O (a) =da  0, while @ezm2 =@a c0 (ezm2 )  0). The third
term is always negative as @ezm2 =@a  0 and dwN;N (ea) =dea  0. Finally, we nd that wN;N (ea)  
wO;O (a)  c (ezm2 )  0, as
wN;N (ea)  wO;O (a)  c (ezm2 ) = wN;N (ea)  wO;O (a)  eN;N2 (ea)  O;O2 (a)
=
1
9
2645ea ea   1 + sN| {z }
( )
+
 
1 + sO   2a2    1 + sN2| {z }
( )
375  0.
The rst term of sign[@eaw=@a] is then positive as
@2ezm2 (a;ea)
@ea@a =
@eN;N2
@ea @O;O2@a c00
h
(c) 1
eN;N2   O;O2 i
c0
h
(c) 1
eN;N2   O;O2 i3  0,
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since @eN;N2 =@ea  0, @O;O2 =@a  0, and c0  0, and provided that c00  0. Though the sign
of @eaw=@a is ambiguous in general, we can have @eaw=@a  0 when the entrant is the leader in
ber investments in particular when wN;N (ea)   wO;O (a)   c (ezm2 ) is high enough (provided that
dwO;O (a) =da+ @ezm2 =@a c0 (ezm2 )  0 and that the investment cost is convex).
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